- Uncrewed systems are portrayed as disruptive by themselves, but the report argues they become transformational when combined with digitized command and control and meshed civil-military sensor networks.
- The report states that the shift from scarce battlefield information to information profligacy is pushing higher-quality awareness to the tactical edge and changing command, control, tactics, training, and operational art.
- Recent battlefield experience is used to argue that inexpensive uncrewed systems can impose costs on adversaries by forcing them to expend expensive defenses or accept losses from repeated attacks.
- The adaptation battle in Ukraine and elsewhere shows a growing need for cost-effective counter-autonomy systems, including electronic warfare, missile systems, connected sensors, gun defenses, and inexpensive interceptor drones.
- The report argues that Allied militaries must empower junior leaders through mission command because distributed forces may not retain uninterrupted connectivity with higher headquarters in modern combat conditions.
This report examines how uncrewed systems are changing military operations when integrated with digitized command and control and meshed civil-military sensor networks. Drawing on examples from Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Gaza, northern Israel, and U.S. and allied experimentation, it argues that drones alone are disruptive but become transformational as part of a broader “transformative trinity” that pushes actionable information to the tactical edge. The report finds that cheaper, more expendable uncrewed systems can impose costs on adversaries, reduce risk to personnel, compress detection-to-destruction timelines, and require new counter-autonomy and electronic warfare capabilities. It also stresses that the resulting information environment demands a different balance between centralized intent and decentralized execution, with empowered junior leaders using mission command. The paper identifies reforms in people, process, and procurement as necessary to realize this potential, including new training models, organizational concepts, acquisition approaches, allied collaboration, experimentation, swarming, and lessons repositories. Its policy relevance centers on recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense and allied militaries to accelerate adoption of uncrewed systems within broader warfighting transformation and to compete more effectively with China, Russia, and other adversaries.
A world of truly smart machines is here, and it requires major adjustments to military institutions and their processes.
SCSP
- Establish a temporary, cross-service task force to explore warfighting implications and new training models. This work should also include exploration of different organizational constructs in the air, sea, and land domains.
- Consider acquisition strategies that separate the design of uncrewed systems from manufacturing. The government should be able to choose the best design and then allow companies to compete to manufacture at scale.
- Explore an alliance variation of the transformative trinity under an AUKUS-like model. Ensuring that meshed sensors, digitized C2 and uncrewed systems integrate across Services and alliances is essential.
- Create a single common-access portfolio for uncrewed systems. This portfolio should include members from the Services, defense agencies, and allied militaries.
Published by the Special Competitive Studies Project. Co-publishers and external authors, where they exist, are credited in the byline above.